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International Standards on Auditing in the International Financial Services 
Centres: What Matters? 
Abstract 
Purpose- This paper aims to (1) investigate the position of International Financial Services 
Centres (IFSCs) in the International Federation of Accountants’ countries’ status on 
International Standards on Auditing’s adoption and (2) assess the factors influencing ISA 
adoption in these Centres.  
Design/methodology/approach- This research drew its data from various sources, including 
the World Economic Forum dataset, the World Bank Report on Observation of Standards and 
Codes, the World Development Indicators and the Economic Intelligence Unit Report on 
Democracy Index on fifty countries classified as IFSCs. The adoption status is then regressed 
on a number of variables of interest. To establish that our results are robust, we used a 
combination of different regression techniques comprising OLS, multinomial and logistic 
regressions. 
Findings- In addition to GDP growth and education level, this paper adds new evidence to 
the literature by reporting the positive association between the level of democracy and the 
enforcement of securities’ regulation on ISA adoption. It argues that political, economic, 
social and legal factors impact on ISA adoption in the IFSCs. 
Research limitations/implications- The sample size is limited to 50 from a population of 99 
IFSCs because of lack of data. Some of the independent variables are basically archival data. 
Reliance is placed on WEF with regard to the measurement of protection of minority interest, 
securities and exchange regulations, and on Economic Intelligence Unit for democracy index. 
Practical implications- This paper stresses the importance of ISAs in IFSCs and the role of 
political power and the enforcement of securities laws on the adoption of ISA. 
Originality/value-This study fills the research gap relating to the absence of empirical 
studies on ISA adoption and its drivers in IFSCs. 
Keywords: International Financial Services Centre, International Standards on Auditing, 
IFAC 
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International Standards on Auditing in the International Financial Services Centres 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors that drive the adoption of International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA) in International Financial Services Centres (IFSC). ISA is 
considered as important as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and corporate 
governance codes in ensuring a sound financial system of a country. This is because financial 
statements audited under ISAs are considered credible and of good quality (Needles et al., 
2002) and, therefore, gives investors more comfort when making economic decisions 
(Schockaert and Houyoux, 2007; Mennicken, 2008; Humphrey et al., 2009). The World Bank 
in its Reports on Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC) emphasise the importance of 
ISA adoption as a tool to enhance confidence in the financial system of a country 
(www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html). Investors, regulators as well as international agencies 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the European Union 
(EU), the International Auditing and Assurance Board (IAASB), the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are interested in the auditing standards 
being followed by auditors while conducting financial statements audit of firms in a country. 
For example, the WEF uses the adoption of and compliance with ISA by a country as a proxy 
for the strength of the country’s auditing and reporting system, as a national competitive 
index. The WB emphasises the importance of the strength of auditing standards to determine 
the transparency of financial information in a country. The WTO requires countries to 
comply with international standards (Al-Akra et al., 2009) before they can obtain 
membership since such compliance enhances the harmonisation of systems and practices 
among its members, in addition to increasing reliability and transparency of financial 
information. Also, aids from international agencies such the IMF and the International Bank 
of Research and Development are tied to a condition that international standards (in this 
paper ISAs) are adopted by the borrowing country (Judge et al., 2010). 
 
Some of the previous studies on auditing have mainly looked at individual auditing standards 
and or auditing standards in a specific country (e.g. Bedard and Gendron, 2010; Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan, 2012). Others such as Needles et al. (2002) identified tentative factors which 
might explain delays in, or partial levels of, ISA adoption at the country level. Boolaky et al. 
(2013) provided evidence on the adoption of ISAs in Europe whilst Humphrey et al. (2009) 
emphasised the role of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) as the ISAs issuer 
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and that of the international financial regulators (such as IOSCO
1
) as watchdog on ISAs users 
– mainly large audit firms.  Humphrey et al. (2009, 2013)  reported on the calls made by 
investors, regulators and the the general public for greater harmonisation of auditing 
standards after the financial crises while Kohler (2009) found that some European countries’ 
auditing standards are not in line with the ISAs. The World Bank Reports on Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) also highlighted the same finding for a number of countries. 
Nevertheless, none of these studies has referred to IFSCs which play a key role in the global 
economy and which investors use as a platform to mitigate, if not eliminate, tax burden or 
launder their money. 
 
The IFAC Compliance Report 2012 revealed the status of ISA adoption in126 countries. 
These levels of adoption can be grouped into four categories (i) wholesale adoption, (ii) 
modified adoption, (iii) unofficial adoption and (iv) non-adoption. The wholesale adoption is 
either mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory means ISA is required by law or standard-setter 
while voluntary means there is no enforcement of law to adopt ISA. Modified adoption 
means ISA is adapted to fit the context of a country and adoption is mainly voluntary. 
Unofficial adoption applies to those countries claiming to have adopted ISAs but for which 
IFAC does not have any evidence. Non-adoption applies to countries that do not adopt ISAs 
at all. There are many IFSCs in this list of countries. IFSCs comprised of jurisdictions 
sensitive to tax evasion and avoidance as well as risk of money laundering. So, an interesting 
question to answer is: where are IFSCs positioned in the IFAC official list of ISA adoption? 
Arguably, the expectation is for IFSCs to adopt and comply with ISAs so as to increase the 
confidence of financial statements’ users. However, as per IFAC, only six of them require 
ISA adoption by law, in fifteen of these countries, standard setters adopted ISAs but they are 
not necessarily mandatory, whereas in another fifteen, ISAs are adopted with modification. 
Three have not adopted ISAs at all and eleven remain in the unknown zone, that is, as 
unofficial adopters. Despite belonging to the same group, there is a variation in the basis of 
adoption by IFSCs and this could be driven by a number of factors worthy of investigating 
and the outcomes of which will add further to existing auditing literature and also provide 
useful information to regulators, professional practitioners, international agencies and 
governments.  
 
                                                          
1
 International Organisation of Securities’ Commissions.  
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Motivated by the above studies, reports and the specificity of IFSCs (in terms of risk of 
money laundering, tax evasion and accounting irregularities), this study provides empirical 
evidence on the factors influencing ISA adoption in this unique context. It is therefore the 
first, that we are aware of, to investigate the adoption of ISAs (as a tool utilised by auditors to 
provide reasonable assurance) within the IFSCs. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it investigates the 
predictors of ISA adoption in a unique environment, international financial services centres 
and provides evidence on the mode of ISA adoption and its predictors. Secondly, many 
researchers have focused on the importance of political system on accounting standards and 
practices of a country (Nobes, 1998, Hope et al., 2005; Boolaky and Cooper, 2015), however, 
none has provided empirical evidence as to how political system of a country can either 
hinder or facilitate the adoption process of international standards on auditing. This research 
therefore contributes to mainstream literature on auditing by providing evidence on the 
specific political, economic, legal and social factors impacting on ISA adoption. It contends 
that, in a country with a high level of democracy, there is more freedom of choice, speech and 
media, thus, facilitating the ISA adoption process. Thirdly, this study contributes to 
knowledge as it reveals that, in most of the IFSCs that are regarded as tax havens or offshore 
centres where tax avoidance is highly probable, the adoption of ISA is less likely and the 
determinants of adoption of international best practice is also less probable. The study’s 
findings are important to (1) heads of States and relevant government Ministries in their roles 
to adopt international best practice in their own country, (2) regulators as regards the intensity 
of the law and its enforcement on ISA adoption, (3) foreign investors who always look at 
reliability of financial information of a country, (4) multi-nationals that would always expect 
their host country to adhere to international standards, (5) international bodies such as IFAC 
to obtain an overview of what motivates and or inhibits ISA adoption and (6) OECD and the 
World Bank who oversees the operations of IFSC. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief profile of the 
international financial services centres, Section 3 discusses the implications of ISA adoption 
for IFSCs and Section 4 discusses the theories underpinning ISA adoption with a view to 
developing the study’s hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research methods while the results 
are reported in section 6. The paper ends with a concluding note in section 7. 
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 2. International Financial Services Centres: A brief profile  
International Financial Services Centres (IFSCs) are large international full-service centres. 
They operate with advanced settlement and payments systems, supporting large domestic 
economies, with deep and liquid markets where both the sources and applications of funds 
are diverse, and where legal and regulatory frameworks are adequate to mitigate the agency 
risks.    As at 2007, London was the largest and most established such centre in term of 
assets, followed by New York. The reason was that the proportion of international to 
domestic business was much greater in London than New York. The motivations for non-
resident financial dealings with IFSCs may include local savoir-faire, zero taxation and 
supple regulation among others,  while the nature of the activities undertaken in such 
jurisdictions include banking, insurance and special purpose vehicles (SPVs). Furthermore, 
the setting up of an IFSC usually eventuates from a conscious effort by a Government to 
develop a specialist part of the economy relating to the export of financial services in order to 
generate revenues that often constitute a significant proportion of the national income.  There 
are official lists of IFSCs namely, the International Monetary Fund’s list, the Financial 
Secrecy Index and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
list. The study primarily draws countries that appear under any two of these three lists. Table 
1 below is a list of fifty IFSCs together with their mode of ISA adoption. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
3. Implications of International Standards for Auditing in IFSCs 
The assurance provided by external audit on financial reports is fundamental in capitalist 
economies (IFSCs) as investors rely on financial statements to make critical investment and 
risk management decisions (Francis and Wang, 2008). In every episode of economic crisis, 
concerns were raised about auditing quality. In the Asian crisis for example, there was a call 
for more attention to the development of and compliance with ISAs to enhance financial 
statements quality (Mennicken, 2008; Humphrey et al., 2009).  Similarly, during the global 
financial crisis in 2008, auditors were criticised for failing to uncover the risks and properly 
reporting these to users of accounts (See Aziz and Omoteso, 2014). As such, there was a call 
for reshaping the profession including review of auditing standards and auditor’s report. 
Sikka (2009) suggests auditors are part and parcel of certain corporate collapse, whereas, 
others argue that accounting including auditing amplify the crisis instead of driving it 
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(Waymire and Basu, 2011).  A former minister in Ireland (which includes Dublin, an IFSC) 
has severely criticised auditors “as a joke and waste of time …….. ” (Irish Times, 18 October 
2008 in Sikka, 2009). 
 
Needles et al., (2002) provided a number of reasons for the lag in the development and 
adoption of ISA
i
 and further emphasised the need for greater coordination between 
international and local auditing standards. They further suggest that harmonisation of auditing 
standards at an international level has a far way to go, a view also supported by Kohler 
(2009) on ISAs in the European Union. He found that many EU countries have not adopted 
ISAs per se. Similar findings are also reported by the World Bank in the ROSCs
ii
. These 
issues have also been found relevant to the EU bloc (Kohler, 2009) and have been 
acknowledged as part of attempts to improve the global ‘financial architecture’ in the 
aftermath of the recent financial crisis (Humphrey et al., 2009; Ojo, 2010). Fraser (2010) is, 
however, particularly critical of the absence of a coherent approach to ISA adoption by the 
EU leadership and the delays have been attributed to the slow legislative process in member 
countries. However, IFSCs include both developed and emerging economies and are 
expected to have in place a sound regulatory framework (both technical and legal), a high 
standard of education and political stability to be able to comply with international auditing 
standards. 
  
As far as we are aware, none of the current study on the adoption of ISAs has focussed on  
the IFSCs, where extremely huge funds are frequently transited and, more so, registration and 
administration of companies are remote. Mennicken (2008) provides an extensive case study 
of how a leading Russian audit firm sought to adopt international auditing standards and one 
of his conclusions is that the political, economic and social context including language affects 
the audit practice of a country. Al-Awaqleh (2010) suggests that, in Jordan, local users, 
preparers, auditors and regulators prefer ISAs to local standards on auditing because foreign 
investors and international agencies would perceive the latter to be inadequate. On the 
contrary, Brody et al. (2005) document the case of accounting and auditing standards in 
Poland and conclude that its local regulator only supports the use of ISAs in the absence of 
equivalent local standards. Although the authors highlight the fact that Poland would need to 
improve its standards to meet the EU directives, they find that there is some resistance in 
adopting EU-directed standards on a wholesale basis. (see also Dellaportas et al., 2008).  
None of these studies has delved into the adoption of ISAs at a country level and, in 
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particular, in jurisdiction(s) classified as IFSCs where risks are high. We attempt to fill the 
gap. 
 
4. Theory and Hypotheses 
There are a number of studies on the environmental factors influencing IFRS (Choi and 
Mueller, 1992; Nobes, 1998; Boolaky and Jallow, 2008; Guerrerio et al., 2008; Nobes and 
Parker, 2006; Nobes, 2008) For example, Nobes and Parker (2006) and Choi and Mueller 
(1992) provide a list of factors affecting accounting development including the decision to 
adopt international financial reporting standards. Among these factors are political, 
economic, legal and social factors of a country (see also Wallace and Gernon, 1991; Mueller 
et al., 1994; Schnepper and Guillen, 2004). Industrialised nations have developed their own 
local accounting standards over time. However, with globalisation that has eased capital 
mobility across the world, they have moved towards the adoption of IFRS in order to be on 
same level playing field with their trading partners (Judge et al. 2010, p.162). In like manner, 
we are arguing that it is worthy to investigate if the same conditions influence ISA adoption 
decision among IFSCs.  
4.1 Political factors and ISA  
Accounting standards are the product of political decisions (Belkaoui, 1983; Larson and 
Kenny, 1995; Barbue, 2004) and a political decision is a product of political power (Rahman, 
1998). According to Belkaoui (1983), civil freedom is vital in the development of accounting 
practices in a country. He suggests that there is a lack of democracy in a country with low 
level of political freedom thereby limiting people’s freedom of choice in all forms. These 
include freedom of expression, freedom of association and free media (Houque et al., 2012). 
Freedom of association includes the freedom of a country to associate with international 
bodies such as IFAC and adopting international standards. We therefore argue that the 
development of auditing standards and the choice to adopt ISAs would easily prevail in a 
democratic country where all these indicators of freedom prevail. On the contrary, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) suggest that free media is a setback for a few post-communist countries 
trying to introduce open market economies. Larson and Kenny (1995) argue that if a country 
is politically stable, its stability will have a positive impact on the economy and, 
consequently, its accounting development (including auditing).  Rahman (1998) contends that 
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political power would influence the development of accounting standards as well as the 
adoption of those standards. Political power in a country is influenced by its level of 
democracy, that is, its democratic index. We are arguing that IFSCs with a high level of 
democracy is more likely to adopt ISA as opposed to those which are low on the scale. Our 
analysis of the IFSCs’ democratic indices suggests that 38 of the 50 IFSCs lie in the score 
range of 6-10 which therefore suggests that the power to influence ISA adoption in these 
jurisdictions is strong. Given with this large number of democratic countries among IFSCs, 
we surmise that: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of democracy and adoption of ISA. 
4.2 Economic factors and ISA 
There is a link between economic development and accounting quality (Larson, 1993, 
Mueller et al., 1994; Nobes, 1998; Zeghal and Mhedhbi, 2006, Ding et al., 2007). Mueller et 
al., (1994) contends that there is a positive correlation between the rate of economic growth 
and quality of accounting. Zeghal and Mhedhbi, (2006) demonstrate that economic growth is 
associated with the adoption of IFRS (see Arpan and Radebaugh, 1987).  Similar to Mueller 
et al., (1994), Bushman and Smith (2001) contend that the interaction between investor 
protection and high quality accounting positively affects economic growth while Ding et al. 
(2007) argue that the economic development of a country shapes its accounting standards, 
hence auditing standards as well. The growth of IFSCs since 1980 has been remarkable with 
an average per capita yearly growth of 3.3% and approximately 3 times greater that world 
growth rate (STEP Report, 2009). This rapid economic growth is the outcome of high levels 
of foreign investment. Investors around the world attempt to invest in these jurisdictions for 
certain specific economic benefits including a high level of transparency on their 
investments. IFSCs, in return, are required to be sufficiently developed to be able to sustain 
the demand for more reliable information. This can be achieved by high scores on 
governance quality. Our argument is that the more developed an IFSC is, the more likely it 
will adopt international standards. We therefore hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between economic growth and ISA adoption. 
Extant literature suggests that the size (Salter and Nishwander, 1995), the strength (Nobes, 
1998), and the sophistication (Jemakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; Boolaky and 
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Cooper, 2015) of the capital market are positively associated with the adoption of IFRS and 
accounting and auditing quality (see Hope et al., 2005).  Nobes (1998) suggests that a country 
with a strong equity market is more likely to adopt IFRS whereas Jemakowicz and Gornik-
Tomaszewski (2006) contend that a country with a financial market that offers foreign listing 
and foreign trading facilities is more likely to adopt IFRS. Given that many of the IFSCs have 
a stock market and that their strength varies, it is worth investigating the impact on ISA 
adoption. Using market capitalisation as a variable of interest, we posit that 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the strength of the capital market and ISA 
adoption. 
4.3 Legal system(s) and ISA 
Accounting and auditing quality is directly linked with the legal tradition of a country 
(Nobes, 1983; David and Brierly, 1985; Salter and Doupnik, 1992; Nobes, 1998; Francis et 
al., 2003; Boolaky, 2004; Nobes and Parker, 2006). David and Brierly (1985) use different 
legal systems to classify legal traditions including common law and civil law among others. 
Nobes (1998) uses basic common law and civil law to classify countries’ accounting systems 
(see also Salter and Doupnik, 1992). Germany, Portugal, Spain, Monaco, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Belgium are among the IFSCs that used Accounting Plan but have now moved 
towards part adoption or wholesale adoption of IFRS as well as ISA (see Table 1 above). 
The legal system in a country uses mechanisms in the form of laws (or rule of law) to 
discipline managers and mitigate the risk of insider dealings (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000, 
2006; Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 
2008). For example, corporate law across many countries, including IFSCs, require directors 
to prepare and submit a true and fair financial statement to the shareholders at the annual 
general meeting. The law further requires that an independent external auditor should express 
a professional opinion about the truth and fairness of the financial statement being presented 
by directors. This paper argues that adopting and complying with international standards on 
auditing are crucial to gain confidence of investors and, in particular, foreign investors or 
companies registered and managed offshore as is the case in IFSCs. Drawing from extant 
literature, it suggests that the adoption of ISA is more likely in a country where: the legal 
system provides strong protection for investors, lenders and borrowers, there is judicial 
independence and securities laws are enforceable. IFSCs are expected to be highly regulated, 
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hence, ISA adoption is highly probable. As regards developing countries, they may have 
adopted ISA in full just to save cost involved in training and implementation (Boolaky, 2012) 
and, secondly, because of pressure from the World Bank to adopt the ISA. While many 
researchers have relied on La Porta et al.’s (1997) database for investor protection, others 
have been critical about his method of constructing investor protection measures (see 
Kaufmann et al., 2007; Spamann, 2010). Given the shortcomings in La Porta et al.’s database, 
we have used data from the WEF. We use the following legal variables as predictors of ISA 
adoption namely: (1) protection of minority interest, lenders and borrowers rights’ index, 
enforcement of securities laws and judicial independence. The WEF publishes scores of these 
variables as national competitiveness index on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the weakest 
score and 7 the highest score. As a result of high correlation between judicial independence, 
lenders’ and borrowers’ rights and protection of minority interests, we had to recourse to only 
the latter to eliminate the presence of collinearity. 
Ball et al. (2000), Daske et al. (2008) contend that a jurisdiction with weak minority investor 
protection law creates more space for corrupt accounting practices as opposed to a country 
with strong investor protection (La Porta et al., 1997; 2000; 2006). We therefore propose that 
a country with strong investor protection law is more apt to adopt international standards on 
auditing because, by so doing, investors will feel more confident as regard the quality of audit 
and assurance of the financial statements.   
H4: There is a positive relationship between minority investor protection and ISA adoption. 
 
Across the globe, securities laws emphasise on corporate conducts in term of disclosure 
practices (Hope, 2003). In order to ensure that listed companies are transparent, they are 
required to have their financial statements audited in accordance with international standards 
so as to reduce the risk of information asymmetry (Beneish and Vargus, 2002). This applies 
mainly to countries where cross border listing or foreign listing and foreign trading of 
securities are permissible. We are arguing that IFSCs do not only have securities markets of 
the like but companies therein are also responsible to prepare and file audited financial 
reports as prescribed by law. We use the score of securities exchanges regulations from WEF 
as a proxy for the enforcement of securities laws in the IFSCs. We argue that the higher the 
score, the more likely will be the adoption of ISA. We therefore hypothesise that: 
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H5: There is a positive relationship between the enforcement of securities laws and ISA 
adoption. 
4.4 Social factors and ISA 
The dominant culture of accounting firms in a given country impacts more on its accounting 
practices than national cultures (Parboteeah et al., (2002). These authors came to this 
conclusion after comparing national culture of the US against Japanese accounting firms. 
Collective value and conformity of thought and deed, however, can be attained by the 
educational system and the level of literacy in a particular country. Mainstream accounting 
literature has shown that the educational level of a country can affect its accounting 
development (see Nobes, 1983; Gray, 1988; Zhegal and Mhdehbi, 2006). Zhegal and 
Mhdehbi, (2006) suggest that modern accounting systems depend on education. Brody et al., 
(2005) and Al-Awaqleh (2010) argue that a lack of professional education and training has 
negatively affected progress in the accounting and auditing field. This view is also repeated 
in the ROSC reports of many countries. Our argument is that the decision to adopt ISA is 
important because it requires an appreciation of whether there is a sufficient level of 
competence, both from an academic and a professional standpoint, to be able to understand 
and apply these standards. Dow and Karunaratna (2006) argue that the higher the level of 
education of a country, the deeper and larger will be its trade (see also Menicken, 2008 on 
education and training for audit professionals).  Likewise, there are many other studies that 
provide support for education as a significant determinant of the adoption of international 
standards (see Guler et al., 2002; Hassan, 2008; Judge et al., 2010). We therefore hypothesise 
that: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between educational attainment and ISA adoption. 
 
5 Research Design 
5.1 Data  
We follow a number of studies on IFRS adoption and accounting quality in regard to sources 
and the type of data for our study. However, taking into account some inherent weaknesses in 
La Porta et al’s. (2000) data (such as the measurement basis and its being dated - over 15 
years), we have therefore recourse to other more reliable and up-to-date source(s). Focusing 
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on country-level determinants of ISA adoption in this study, we use the same proxies as 
Judge et al., (2010) for macro-economic data and those similar to Houque et al.’s (2012) for 
others. Various sources have therefore been used in sourcing the study’s data. These include 
the Global Competitiveness Report (2009-2012) of the WEF; the World Bank Report (2002–
2012) on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), the IFAC’s Compliance Program 
Report (2009); World Bank Indicators and Economic Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
Report. Data from WEF are scores measured on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = worst or weakest and 7 
= best or strongest) whereas data on ISA adoption is from IFAC and coded as 1 to 4 (1 not 
adopted and 4 adopted by law). The economic data are mainly hard data reported by the 
World Bank Indicators. As far as the democracy index is concerned, it is measured on a scale 
of 0-10 and classifies political regimes or democracy index into four groups, namely: full 
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regime and autocracy regimes. 
 
5.2 Sample Design 
The sample comprises countries that are defined as IFSCs under any two the following three 
bodies: MF, Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) and OECD while a country that is designated as 
IFSC by only one of the three bodies is excluded from the sample. As it stands there are 99 
jurisdictions that are listed as IFSCs but only 59 are classified as IFSCs by two of the three 
bodies. Out of the59 jurisdictions, data was only available for 50 of them. 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
Our empirical model follows that of Judge et al.’s (2010). We also use different regression 
techniques to investigate the determinants of ISA adoption in the IFSCs. First, we treat ISA 
adoption as an ordinal variable with four categories ranging from “no” adoption to 
“mandatory” adoption and use OLS regression for the analysis. The Durbin-Watson test is 
also run to determine the presence of serial correlation error. Because the modus of adoption 
has more than 2 categories, it can be defined as a multinomous variable thus allowing the use 
of multinomial regression. We therefore use multinomial regression to test robustness of the 
OLS results. We further test for robustness by re-categorising ISA adoption as a dichotomous 
variable and use logistic regression to fit each of these models. The analytical method used to 
test the hypotheses involves the estimation of the following general form equation for a data 
set of 50 countries for 2012. 
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5.3.1 Empirical Models 
Model 1: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 DEMO + β2 GDPGR + β3 MKCAP + β4 PMIS + β5 SER+ β6 EDU + Fixed 
effects. 
Model 1 is a fixed effect model with year specific dummy variables controlling for time 
period. The results are reported in Table 4. 
Model 2: log(Pij/Pi1)= β0 + β1 DEMO + β2 GDPGR + β3 MKCAP + β4 PMIS + β5 SER+ β6 EDU + ε 
This is a multinomial regression to assess the robustness of the results from Model1. The 
results are reported in Table 5. 
Model 3: (𝑷𝒊/(𝟏 − 𝑷𝒊) = β0 + β1 DEMO + β2 GDPGR + β3 MKCAP + β4 PMIS + β5 SER+ β6 EDU + ε 
This model is a logistic regression used to further test robustness of the original results. The 
results are reported in Table 6. 
5.3.2 Variable Definition  
5.3.2.1 Dependent Variable- ISA Adoption 
ISA Adoption is the dependent variable and defined as ISAADOPT. This data is drawn from 
the IFAC dataset “Basis of ISA Adoption”. IFAC groups countries on the basis of adoptioniii 
using four categories. The dependent variable takes one of the four categories to determine 
the degree of ISA adoption by a country (see Judge et al., 2010; Boolaky, 2012). When a 
country is coded “4” it means that ISA is mandatory by law, “3” national standard setters 
have adopted ISA as auditing standards but not mandatory by law, “2” ISAs have been 
generally adopted as the local auditing standards but subject to modification and, when a 
country is coded as “1”, it means the IFAC does not have adequate information to evaluate 
the status of adoption of ISA within that country, which suggests that there is little to no 
engagement with ISAs (see Boolaky and Cooper, 2015). 
5.3.2.2 Independent Variable 
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Democracy index (DEMO) is measured on a scale of 0-10 and is based on 60 indicators 
grouped in five categories (EIU Report, 2012, p.27). The index values place countries in to 
one of four categories viz: 8-10 (full democracies), 6-7.9 (flawed democracies, 4-5.9 (hybrid 
regimes and scores below 4 is authoritarian regimes (EIU Report, 2012, p.28). 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the GDP growth and measured as the average growth rate 
in gross national income from 2009 to 2012.  
Average market capitalisation (MKCAP) is a percentage of gross domestic product from 
2009 to 2012. 
Protection of minority interest (PPMIS) is the average score of the protection of minority 
interests in a country as published by the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World 
Economic Forum (2009-2012). It is measured on a scale of 1-7. 
Enforcement of securities laws SER) is drawn from WEF and is the score of securities 
exchanges regulations measured on a scale of 1-7. 
Level of education is the average score for the level of tertiary education in the country and is 
drawn from WEF for the period 2009-2012.  
6. Empirical Findings 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
We report the descriptive statistics on the variables in Table 2. The mean of ISA adoption 
(ISAADOP) scaled by category of 1 to 4 is 2.14. We note from Table 1 that ISA adoption is 
mandatory only in 6 of the 50 IFSCs. As regards the adoption of ISA on a voluntary basis by 
standard setters, 15 IFSCs are reported to have adopted ISA. For the next category of ISA 
adopters, “adopting ISA with modification” 15 out of 50 IFSCs have chosen this modus of 
adoption. Finally, there are few of the IFSCs that have not adopted ISA (4 out of 50).  
Democracy index has a mean of 4.69 (measured on a scale of 0-10). The rate of Gross 
Domestic Product has a mean of 65.14 whereas market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 
4.17. GDPGR has a high variation rate with a standard deviation of 63.378. Protection of 
minority interest (PMIS), as measured on a scale of 1-7 has a mean of 4.68.  The mean score 
of the enforcement of the securities and exchange regulations is 4.85.Higher education has a 
mean of 4.997 with a standard deviation of .992.   
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6.2 Correlations and Collinearity 
We began with a larger number of independent variables. However, many of them have 
relatively high correlations. We therefore further investigated the presence of collinearity 
problem by calculating the variance inflations factors (VIF) and tolerance factor (TF) for 
these variables to obtain a reasonable assurance that there is no collinearity between the 
independent variables that would distort our analyses. As a result, we eliminated all 
independent variables that were highly correlated and this left us with only six variables that 
could be tested as possible predictors of ISA adoption. Hair et al., (2006) suggest that a 
tolerance value less than .10 and a VIF greater than 9 indicate multi-collinearity problem.  
Neither the VIF nor the TF test for these six variables is beyond this stated threshold (see also 
Field, 2000). The Pearson correlation results are reported in Table 3. We also verify for serial 
correlation error by calculating a Durbin-Watson test. The result of this is reported in Table 4. 
 
6.3 Regression Results 
6.3.1 Linear Regression 
The regression results are reported in Table 4. Model 1 is the linear regression model. It 
reveals that four independent variables are significant predictors of ISA adoption in the 
IFSCs. The overall model fit is 40.8 % measured by the adjusted R-square. In particular, 
Gross Domestic Product is the most significant predictor of ISA adoption in the IFSCs (t= 
2.953, p< .01). This result supports hypothesis 3 and aligns with Judge et al., (2010) who 
argued that the higher the GDP growth, the more likely a country will adopt IFRS, hence 
ISA. This finding also sits well with the assertion of Larson (1993) who provided empirical 
evidence on how economic growth in Africa led to the adoption of international accounting 
standards. The second most significant predictor of ISA adoption is the educational 
attainment in these jurisdictions (t = 2.472, p < .05) thus, hypothesis 6 is supported. This 
result is in line with those of Guler et al., (2002) and Dow and Karunaratha (2006) who also 
contend that the degree of professional education within a country influences the decision of 
that country on whether to adopt or not adopt ISA.  While Nobes (1998) argued that the more 
developed the capital market of a country is, the more sophisticated is the accounting and 
reporting system it requires, Larson and Kenny (1995) contended that there is an association 
between a country’s adoption of international accounting standard and the strength of its 
capital market by looking at market capitalisation. We have extended this literature by 
investigating the association between the enforcement of securities and exchange regulations 
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and ISA adoption. Our result suggests that this variable is positioned as a moderately 
significant predictor of ISA adoption (t = 0.373, p< 0.10) thus providing empirical support for 
hypothesis 5. This result suggests that if an IFSC has a strong securities exchange 
regulations’ system, then it will be more apt to adopt international standards on auditing.  
Mainstream accounting and auditing literature have delved into a broad discussion on the role 
of political systems in the adoption of international standards but with less emphasis on 
empirical insights (in terms of investigation and analysis). For the first time, we have 
attempted to demonstrate how the level of democracy in a country can influence its decision 
on ISA adoption. The study therefore provides empirical support to existing discussion in the 
literature such as the contention of Larson and Kenny (1995 and Barbue (2004). Our finding 
suggests that the level of democracy is a moderately significant predictor of ISA adoption, 
(p< 0.10). This suggests that the more democratic an IFSC is, the more likely it will adopt 
ISA. This finding ties well with our data. There are only 13 fully democratic countries in the 
sample, 25 are flawed democracies and the rest are not. If the level democracy improves in 
these 25 countries in the future, the decision to move to a full and mandatory ISA adoption 
could also increase. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. To our surprise, the linear regression 
rejects hypotheses 3 and 4 but shows a positive relationship between ISA adoption and 
market capitalisation and between ISA adoption and protection of minority interest. As 
regards hypothesis 3, the result does not contradict the association between capital market 
regulation and accounting. However, this variable loses significance in the IFSCs and that 
could be due to less rigorous regulation within the jurisdiction. Our finding for hypothesis 4 
is also not contrary to Francis and Wang (2008) and La Porta et al, (1997, 2006) who contend 
that there is an association between accounting quality and protection of minority interest. 
The difference is that the level of significance of this variable is not the same. Our argument 
to shed light on our finding for hypothesis 4 is that (i) the number of countries and the list of 
countries that we have considered in this study is different from those of these past studies 
(we have looked mainly at 50 IFSCs) and (ii) our result also suggests that the law related to 
protection of minority interest are not sufficiently strong enough in the IFSCs to push for ISA 
adoption. This is evidenced by the average score of 4.68 for protection of minority interest 
which is below the WEF average score of 5. Overall, the regression results provide empirical 
evidence that political, economic, legal and social factors impact on ISA adoption decision of 
a country. 
6.3.2 Robustness Tests 
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We ran the Durbin-Watson (D-W) test to ensure that there is no serial correlation error in our 
analysis. The D-W test is 1.909. It confirms that there is no such error in our linear regression 
analysis which therefore provides further support to our initial findings. We further determine 
the robustness of the initial regression results in Model 1 by using two other regressions 
techniques namely: multinomial and logistic regressions. The results are reported through 
Model 2 and Model 3 in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. Model 2 is a multinomial regression 
whereas Model 3 a logistic regression. The results from both Models (2 and 3) support our 
results in Model 1. At least, three of the significant predictors from Model 1 are also reported 
to be significant under Model 2 as well as under Model 3. Therefore, using different 
regression techniques, (multinomial and logistic regressions) these results further support our 
hypotheses that political, economic, legal and social factors positively affect ISA adoption. In 
Model 2, GDPPR, SER and EDU are reported to be statistically significant predictors of ISA 
adoption as also revealed in Model 1. The level of democracy is not found to be statistically 
significant but there is, nevertheless, a positive relationship with ISA adoption. 
Model 3 is basically a logistic regression whereby ISA adoption is categorised as “1” adopted 
regardless of the mode of adoption and “0” not adopted. This regression technique also 
supports our contention that political, economic, legal and social factors affect ISA adoption 
decision. In Model 3, the level of democracy, market capitalisation and protection of minority 
interest are also significant determinants of ISA adoption in the IFSCs. Educational 
attainment and enforcement of securities regulations are not statistically significant but still 
positively associated with ISA adoption. The overall model fit is 50.3% 
Our findings from this study show that political, economic, legal and social factors have 
positive and strong impact on the ISA adoption decision in the IFSCs. Our data, drawn from a 
new dataset, support our theoretical contention that ISA adoption in the IFSC is influenced by 
politics, economic factors, legal systems including the rule of laws and the educational levels 
of the IFSCs. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Similar to the variation in the adoption of IFRS, there is also a variation in the mode of ISA 
adoption across the globe. However, countries are attempting to harmonise around both 
international financial reporting standards and international standards on auditing. This move 
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towards a global set of standards including ISAs is important both at country and corporate 
levels. At country level, it brings harmony into governance practices and enables regulators 
to better monitor auditing practices by virtue of a common auditing practice. At corporate 
level, especially those dealing largely in foreign trade or are multi-nationals in operations, 
adopting and complying with ISAs in the audit of financial statements will enhance the 
reliability of financial statements. Extant literature in accounting has provided evidence as to 
how political system, economic development, legal system and social factors influence the 
adoption of accounting standards (Millar et al., 2005; Ding et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2010). 
Our study extends the investigation to ISA adoption and attempts to identify what specific 
political, economic, legal and social variables influence ISA adoption and in a peculiar 
context, that is, the IFSCs. Drawing data from a unique dataset for 50 jurisdictions classified 
as IFSCs, we find relatively strong support for political system, economic development, legal 
mechanisms and social factors as significant determinants of ISA adoption in the IFSCs.  
In fact, we find that political system, measured by the democracy level, economic 
development, measured by growth rate of GDP, legal mechanism, measured by score of 
protection of minority interest and social factors, measured by educational attainment are 
predictive of ISA adoption with a varied level of significance. Among these variables, the 
level of economic development is the most predominant predictor of ISA adoption. 
Interestingly, the study’s findings show that the level of democracy has a moderate impact on 
ISA adoption as is the law relating to the protection of minority interest. These findings are 
important to politicians or Heads of States and relevant government ministries, especially in 
the IFSCs, regulators, professional practitioners including practising auditors, international 
bodies such as IFAC, OECD, IAASB, the World Bank and foreign investors as well as 
accounting scholars.  
Our study contributes to the literature by investigating the predictors of ISA adoption in a 
unique environment, that is, international financial services centres. Many researchers have 
focused on the importance of political system on accounting including auditing standards and 
practices of a country. However, none of these has provided empirical evidence as to how 
political system of a country can either hinder or facilitate the adoption process of 
international standards on auditing. Our findings suggest that if a country has a high level of 
democracy, there will be more freedom of choice, speech and media, thus, facilitating the 
ISA adoption process.  Moreover, regulators operating in these jurisdictions will be able to 
propagate the adoption of best practices because there is less likelihood of negative lobbying. 
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Our findings also could help educators in international financial services by emphasising the 
need for further education and training to facilitate ISA adoption in many of these 
jurisdictions.  
As in any other study, our study has also some limitations. First, our sample size was 
downsized to 50 from a population of 99 IFSCs because we were unable to obtain data for all 
the jurisdictions. This limitation could affect the generalisability of our findings. Secondly, 
we access ISA adoption data published by IFAC and have assumed that there has been no 
significant change(s) until 2012.  As regards some of the independent variables, they are 
basically archival data which can be considered limiting in scope. We also rely on the 
measurement basis used by WEF for protection of minority interest, securities and exchange 
regulations and on Economic Intelligence Unit method of computing democracy index. 
Finally, we acknowledge that the number of countries adopting ISA is constantly changing 
and, as such, our study might not have captured all that existed within the IFSCs.   
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i
 Reasons  for the lag in the development and adoption of ISAs could be explained by (i) the need to resolve 
accounting issues (e.g. measurement) first before considering how to assess the implementation of these 
accounting issues by companies, (ii) the need to initially legislate on accounting and auditing matters to provide 
the necessary legal backing for external audits and financial statements, but a lag may be due to the inherent 
slowness of legislative processes, (iii) the influence of large accounting firms which have historically seen 
themselves as operating in a self-regulatory environment and hence not keen to embrace externally defined 
standards of practice
i
 , (iv) the resistance by local regulators to ISAs since their use of local auditing standards 
allowed them to have some control over audit process, and (v) the low level of professional education and 
training in accounting which would impact on the quality of the auditing function in the country. 
ii
 The ROSC reveals that (1) many countries’ local auditing standards are not in line with ISAs, (2)  in some 
countries although ISAs are required by law yet auditing processes do not fully comply with the standards, (3) 
some other countries do not have in place a local public oversight body to oversee the audit profession, (4) in 
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some countries the ISA translation process is either  delayed or the translation is not equivalent to the original 
meaning  in the ISAs and (5) a lack of education and training hampers compliance with ISAs. 
iii
 Basis of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction  
A. Mandatory: Required by Law or Regulation- Country law or regulation requires the use of ISAs as issued 
by the International Auditing and Assurances Standards Board (IAASB) in the auditing of general purpose 
financial statements. (Classified as Category 4). 
B. Mandatory/Voluntary: ISA are adopted- A national standard-setter has adopted ISAs as the audit standards 
to be used in the country (there are no separate local auditing standards). (Classified as Category 3). 
C. Voluntary: National Standards are the ISAS- While ISAs have generally been adopted as the local 
standards, there may be national modifications to them but changes, if any, are stated to be in line with the 
spirit of IAASB Modifications Policy. (Classified as Category 2). 
D.  Other Unofficial adopter- In some circumstance, available information is not adequate to evaluate 
whether the local   adoption process, including the translation of ISAs into local language, is reasonably up 
to date with translation lags of a year. In other case, where a jurisdiction indicates that the local generally 
accepted auditing standards is “based on” or “similar to” the ISAs, it is not clear whether modifications to 
or other differences from the ISAs meet the requirements of the IAASB Modifications Policy. Finally, there 
are some countries which have declared convergence with ISAs as an objective but still have a way to go in 
achieving this objective. The explanatory notes provide insights into the adoption process (see pp.9-28). 
(Classified as Category 1). 
E. Non-Adoption: Countries that have not adopted ISAs. 
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Table 1: Modus of ISA Adoption by IFSCs     
Required by 
Law 
Adopted by Std 
Setter 
Adopted with 
Modification 
Not 
Adopted 
Others 
Costa Rica Barbados Chile Austria Bahrain 
Cyprus Belgium Denmark Russia Brazil 
Latvia Botswana Germany US Estonia 
Mauritius Canada Hong Kong 
 
Ghana 
Slovakia Czech Rep India 
 
Indonesia 
Slovenia Dominica Israel 
 
Japan 
 
Guatemala Italy 
 
S. Korea 
 
Hungary Malaysia 
 
Macedonia 
 
Ireland Mexico 
 
Qatar 
 
Jamaica Netherlands 
 
UAE 
 
Luxembourg Phillipines 
 
Uruguay 
 
Panama Poland 
  
 
Spain Portugal 
  
 
Trinidad and Tobago Singapore 
  
 
UK Switzerland 
  
Source: www.ifac.org       
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
ISAADOPT 2.14 1.626 50 
DEMO 4.69 1.044 50 
GDPGR 65.14 63.378 50 
MKCAP 4.17 0.944 50 
PMIS 4.68 0.590 50 
SER 4.85 0.518 50 
EDU 4.97 0.992 50 
 
ISADOPT= Adoption of International Standards on Auditing,  
DEMO = Democracy Index, GDPGR = Average Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate, 
MKCAP =  Average Market Capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (2009-2012),  
PMIS= Average Score of Protection of Minority Interest (2009-2012),  
SER= Average Score of Enforcement of Securities and Exchange Regulations (2009-2012), 
EDU = Average Score of Level of Education (2009-2012) 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation 
 ISAADOPT PMIS SER         EDU GDPGR MKCAP DEMO 
ISAADOPT 1.000 
  
        
   
PMIS 0.073 1.000 
     
SER 0.119 0.792 1.000 
    
EDU 0.072 0.796 0.649 1.000 
   
GDPGR -0.35 0.17 0.154 0.06 1.000 
  
MKCAP -0.13 0.388 0.448 0.539 0.088 1.000 
 
DEMO 0.265 0.177 0.064 0.163 0.396 0.015 1 
**p < .01; 
*p<.05 
       
 
     
  Table 4: Model 1: Linear Regression 
Collinearity 
Test 
 
  B T.Value SIG   
 
Tolerance 
Factor  
 
VIF 
Constant 2.225 1.936 0.06 
 
 
      - 
 
- 
DEMO 0.148 1.814 .077* 
 
 
.646 
 
1.548 
GDPGR 0.135 2.953 .005**  
 
.474 
 
2.112 
MKCAP -0.001 0.239 0.812  
 
.322 
 
3.101 
PMIS 0.423 1.232 0.226  
 
.553 
 
1.808 
SER 0.179 0.373 0.071* 
 
 
.263 
 
3.798 
EDU 0.634 2.472 .018** 
 
 
.291 
 
3.431 
Adjusted R Square     0.408   
  
D-W test 
  
1.909 
 
  
N  
  
49 
 
  
* Significant at .10 level, ** Significant at .05 level 
  *** Significant at .01 Level 
None of the independent variable indicates serious multi-collinearity problem 
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Table 5: Model 2-Multinomial Regression Analysis 
  Coefficient Chi-Square 
Constant 4.528 77.028 
 
0.406 3.811 
 
0.283 0.283 
DEMO 1.681 78.166 
 
2.962 4.949 
 
0.085 0.176 
GDPGR 1.359 89.317 
 
5.596 16.1*** 
 
0.018 0.001 
MKCAP 0.007 96.36 
 
0.38* 6.022* 
 
0.58 0.056 
PMIS 5.118 82.492 
 
3.396 9.274** 
 
0.065 0.026 
SER 0.876 104.863 
 
3.716 2.634** 
 
0.041 0.004 
EDU 1.251 92.097 
 
3.937 4.372** 
 
0.054 0.001 
F -value 73.217   
N 49   
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Table 6: Model 3- Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
 
Coefficient Wald Chi-Square SIG 
Constant 7.308 0.28 0.597 
DEMO 4.907 1.928 0.065* 
GDPGR 1.101 2.407 0.121 
MKCAP 0.09 4.609 .032** 
PMIS 11.248 3.172 .075* 
SER 1.374 0.335 0.563 
EDU 4.239 2.231 0.135 
Adjusted R Square 0.503     
F Value 24.363 
  N 49 
          
 
 
 
